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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to examine the issue of non-admissibility of the principle 
of therapeutic privilege in clinical trials. In medical treatment, doctors could decide not 
to disclose information for the best interest of the patients by adopting the principle of 
therapeutic privilege. This principle exempts doctors from disclosing risky information at 
his discretion especially if by doing so will cause harm or trauma to patients. However, this 
principle is not recognised in clinical trials. Instead, the need to obtain patient’s consent by 
way of informed consent has been mandatorily imposed as a way to protect the patients. 
The doctor-investigator must disclose full information pertaining to the trial to the patient. 
This paper is a library based collating literature review data. Qualitative methodology 
and analysis were used in this paper. This paper revealed that despite the fact that the 
principle of therapeutic privilege has not been recognised in clinical trials, the attitude of 
patients that placed high hopes on doctor-investigator has indirectly encouraged the latter 
not to disclose information by adopting this principle. This paper implies that the doctor-
investigator practices the principle of therapeutic privilege, an act of paternalism that has 
been brought into the process of consent taking in clinical trials. In conclusion, the Good 
Clinical Practice Training Curriculum by the Ministry of Heath Malaysia is suggested to 
be improvised and further enhanced.
Keywords: Clinical trials, doctor-investigator, 
informed consent, the principle of therapeutic 
privilege, patient-subject
INTRODUCTION
Clinical trials or medical research using 
human as subject is a patient-orientated 
research. It is a method by doctor-
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investigator to find panacea for all ailments 
by finding better ways to prevent, diagnose 
or treat diseases and disorders, test new 
medicines or devices or to learn about 
health problem by using human subject 
(Jackson, 2006). Using human subject in 
clinical research cannot be avoided as not 
all medical problems could be overcome 
using animal as subject (Jackson, 2006).
In clinical trials, the pre-requisite 
need to obtain patient’s consent by way 
of informed consent has been made 
compulsory to justify the patient’s 
recruitment (Vollman & Winau, 1996). 
The doctor-investigator must disclose full 
information about the trial to the patient. In 
fact, a doctor-investigator is put on a high 
standard of duty to disclose information to 
patient (Moore v. Regents of the University 
of California, 1990). Invariably, this would 
mean that the doctor-investigator cannot 
hide behind the guise of the principle of 
therapeutic privilege, a practice seen in 
normal doctor-patient relationship, into the 
process of consent taking in clinical trials.
It has been exemplified that many 
studies have shown that the doctor-
investigators had failed to disclose 
full information to patient-subjects. 
As mentioned by Rathor et al., (2011) 
“Participants [research—subjects] were 
not told the aim of the trial, its methodology, 
potential hazards or anticipated benefits of 
treatment”. Meanwhile, a study by Yuhanif 
et al., (2014) who studied informed 
consent in clinical trials with reference to 
information disclosure to patient-subjects 
revealed that doctor-investigators in 
Malaysia adopt the principle of therapeutic 
privilege which is not recognised in 
clinical trials. The doctor-investigators 
fail to disclose full information to patient-
subjects. Instead, doctor-investigators only 
disclosed information which they thought 
were necessary for the patient-subjects to 
know. The study also showed that there 
were doctor-investigators who did not 
disclose information at all to the patient-
subjects (Yuhanif et al., 2014). Hence, 
the objective of this paper is to examine 
the non-admissibility of the principle of 
therapeutic privilege in clinical trials which 
are frequently being employed by doctors 
to dilute the exigency of procuring the 
patient consent which must be an informed 
one.
THE REASONS FOR NON-
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF THERAPEUTIC 
PRIVILEGE IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
The principle of therapeutic privilege is 
an exception to the general requirement 
of informed consent. If a doctor feels that 
disclosure of certain information will lead 
to the harm or suffering of the patient, 
she or he is said to be free to withhold 
this information (Etchells et al., 1996). 
In medical treatment, the doctors are 
excluded from disclosing information for 
the best interest of the patients by adopting 
this principle. 
The principle of therapeutic privilege 
is in fact in conflict with the most 
fundamental portion of the Hippocratic 
Oath:“do no harm”. According to the 
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oath, doctor is required to use his or her 
knowledge and skills for the patient’s best 
interest. However, the fact that patients 
are vulnerable and doctors have greater 
medical knowledge indirectly causes the 
latter to decide what is the best for patient 
even though their actions supersede the 
capable patients’ wishes. This is where the 
concept or doctor’s paternalistic approach 
through the principle of therapeutic 
privilege applied for the patient best 
interest. For instance, the patient is too sick 
that it affects his ability to make decisions 
or is not capable of understanding the 
important information about the treatment 
so the doctor’s paternalism has to take over 
(Thomasma, 2008). Doctors recommend 
treatment options based on the evaluation 
of benefits and risks but the patient may 
only assess from the point of sheer emotion. 
Therefore, sometimes the doctor will need 
to use the power of paternalism in order to 
over-rule the patient’s autonomy for the 
patients’ sake - just to protect them. This 
is where the concept or the approach of 
paternalism applies using the principles of 
therapeutic privilege, which is introduced 
in the interest of the patient. This principle 
exempts doctors from conveying risky 
information at his discretion especially if by 
doing so will cause any harm or unnecessary 
trauma to the patients. This means that any 
information to be communicated to the 
patient is at the discretion of the doctor.
The application of the principle of 
therapeutic privilege can be seen in the 
case of Siddaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
Governors ([1984] I ALL ER 1018). 
Lord Scarman held that, “This exception 
[therapeutic privilege] enables a doctor to 
withhold from his patient information as to 
risk if it can be shown that a reasonable 
medical assessment of the patient would 
have indicated to the doctor that disclosure 
would have posed a serious threat ...of 
physiological detriment to the patient”. 
The judgment in Siddaway’s case has 
been applied in Malaysia. The recognition 
to the principle of therapeutic privilege in 
medical treatment can be seen in the case 
of Liew Sin Kiong v Dr Sharon M Pauraj 
([1996] 2 AMR 1403). Justice Ian Chin 
held that if a doctor was of the view that 
a patient was in need of an operation, then 
such benefit outweighs a remote risk as the 
doctor should be allowed the “therapeutic 
privilege” in deciding whether or not to 
disclose the risk.
Another case worth referring to 
is Dr Ismail Abdullah v Poh Hui Lin 
(administrator for the estate of Tan Amoi 
@ Ong Ah Mauy, deceased) ([2009] 2 MLJ 
599). In this case, the respondent/plaintiff 
is the administrator of the deceased’s 
estate. She brought a claim against the 
first and second appellants/defendants for 
medical negligence in, inter alia, failing 
to advise the deceased of the risks of acute 
pancreatitis and acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (‘ARDS’) prior to the operation 
by the first appellant on the deceased to 
remove kidney stones that were causing 
biliary obstruction. The first appellant 
stated, inter alia, that the deceased had 
been advised on and consented to the 
operation. The Sessions Court did not 
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hold the applicants liable for negligence 
when treating the deceased but held that 
they were liable for failing to advise the 
deceased of the risks.
In allowing the appeal with costs, 
Justice Azahar Mohamed held that 
the appellants were not liable as 
only material risks of injury needed to be 
disclosed, not minimal risks. On the effect 
of therapeutic privilege on non-disclosure 
of a material risk, the learned Judge went 
on to say:
If there was in fact a material risk as a 
result of the operation, the first defendant’s 
therapeutic privilege justified the non-
disclosure of it because of her severe 
medical problems. This privilege says 
that such information can be withheld if 
the disclosure would cause serious harm 
to the patient’s health. The deceased 
needed the operation to save her life. The 
first defendant’s therapeutic privilege 
outweighed any duty to warn her of any 
material risk which would result in her 
refusing the life saving operation.
Even though the two cases above did 
not specifically deal with the application 
of therapeutic privilege by doctor, the 
cases did show the recognition of this 
principle in medical treatment. The 
importance of the judgment is that the 
Court recognises medical paternalism 
vis-à-vis therapeutic privilege especially 
in cases of life and death significance. 
Here, the doctors are exercising their 
experts’ opinion or clinical diagnosis 
in order to save the patient’s life. If it 
is justifiable on the basis of clinical 
judgment, the doctor is indeed privilege 
to proceed with the treatment without 
informing the patient. An analogy can 
be made in cases of emergency where 
informed consent is disregarded because 
of the need to save a patient’s life (Re F 
[1990] 2 AC 1 HL).
In contrast, the application of the 
principle of therapeutic privilege is not 
recognised in clinical trials. In support of 
this view, a reference could be made to 
the points put forward by Kennedy and 
Grubb in their book entitled, Medical Law 
(Kennedy & Grubb, 2000). They stated 
that “Lord Scarman’s recourse [in the case 
of Siddaway] to the ‘therapeutic privilege’ 
as justifying non-disclosure of information 
does not apply to information relating to the 
fact that the patient is in a clinical trial and 
what that entails.” A similar view is shared 
by Redmon (1986) who stated that “The 
physician has some latitude (how much is 
a matter of great debate) in informing his 
patient of the risks and other factors in a 
therapeutic procedure, the researcher has 
none. One reason is that the physician is 
working on behalf of his patient and the 
researcher need not be. This, the type of 
paternalistic behavior we might allow 
in the physician is not permissible in the 
researcher ….” The objective of clinical 
trials being conducted is to offer benefits 
to future patients at the sacrificial expense 
of the patients themselves. This is because 
clinical trials focus on creating an overall 
knowledge for the benefits of future 
patients, a process requiring the doctor-
investigator to conduct trial according to 
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a protocol and not according to what is 
individually best for the patient-subjects 
(Morrein, 2005). Moreover, the risks 
inherent in a trial cannot be discounted and 
averted by the patient. It may be a small 
one, but it is always there (Edelson et al., 
2001).
Instead, the need to obtain patient’s 
consent by way of informed consent has 
been made obligatory to safeguard the 
patients. The doctor-investigator must 
fully disclose information about the trial 
to the patient. For example, the objective 
of the trial, purpose of the trial, procedures 
of the trial, alternative methods available, 
probable benefits and risks, the possibility 
of being randomised and that the patient’s 
involvement is voluntary. Thus, it is 
equally vital to inform the patient that he 
can withdraw from the study whenever he 
wanted without jeopardising his current or 
future treatment. In support of this view, 
reference can also be made to Article 1 of 
the Nuremberg Code 1947 which states 
that:
The voluntary consent of the human subject 
is absolutely essential. This means that the 
person involved should have legal capacity 
to give consent; should be so situated as 
to be able to exercise free power of choice, 
without the intervention of any element of 
force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, 
or other ulterior form of constraint or 
coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the 
elements of the subject matter involved as 
to enabled him to make an understanding 
and enlightened decision.
The carnage and ravages of World 
War II had lent us a benign lesson in 
history. The wanton human subject 
experimentation and the aftermath atrocity 
perpetrated had rudely awakened world 
communities. The exposure of the research 
atrocities performed on prisoners of war by 
German doctors and scientists discovered 
after World War II were morbid and 
inhumane. The prisoners were forced to 
serve as subjects without their consent. The 
exposure to this dark episode had made the 
world community felt unease and being 
apprehensive on the aspect of subject’s 
protection particularly to ensure the rights 
of subject are to be respected (McNeill & 
Pfeffer, 2001). The sequel to this incident 
had necessitated that informed consent be 
made as a condition to justify subject’s 
participation in clinical trials (McNeill & 
Pfeffer, 2001). Hence, informed consent 
is introduced to protect patient from being 
abused as subject in order to accomplish 
the strong desire of doctor-investigator 
to acquire new scientific discovery. 
Nevertheless, the special doctor-patient 
relationship exists as a barrier that 





The word ‘special relationship’ is a 
tortuous concept used to determine when 
an individual is casted with a duty to 
protect the other person from risks that are 
not consequent act of that particular person 
himself. However, in the context of medical 
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treatment, a duty of care arises from this 
special relationship between doctor and 
patient when the patient sought a medical 
treatment from the doctor.
Generally, patients believe that 
doctors will always perform their duty 
with full commitment and dedication as 
it involves life and death of their patients. 
Furthermore, the fact that doctors having 
had greater medical knowledge also causes 
patients to rely on them to make decision. 
In fact, throughout history, doctors have 
put up a clarion advised that patients’ 
needs are best served by following doctors’ 
orders. As stated by Talcott Parsons, “[The 
physician’s] competence and specific 
judgments and measure cannot be judged 
by layman. The latter must … take these 
judgments and measures on ‘authority.’ 
The doctor-patient relationship has to be 
one involving an element of authority – we 
speak of ‘doctor’s orders’” (Kantz, 2003). 
The doctors have the knowledge that can 
relieve suffering or save patients’ life. As 
such, it is better for the patient to accept 
the doctor’s suggestion as one of gospel 
truth without question. Further, doctors are 
assumed to act for the best interest of their 
patients and have no reason whatsoever to 
have any spite and ill intentions towards 
them. They always try their level best to 
assist the patients. This kind of attitude is an 
altruist that is based on trust and confident 
that arises from the special relationship 
between the doctors and the patients.
The special relationship between 
patient and doctor-investigator is different 
to the normal doctor-patient relationship. 
The reason is because the scope of 
disclosure required for informed consent 
for clinical trials is different compared to 
the informed consent for ordinary medical 
treatment (Agati, 2006). Consequently, the 
standard of disclosure put on the doctor-
investigator is higher compared to the 
typical doctor. The patient is eligible to 
be informed of all risks, no matter how 
remote of an actual occurrence the risk 
is (Whitlock v. Duke (637 F. Supp. 1463 
[(M.D.N.C. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d 1340 
(4th Cir. 1987)]. In Malaysia, the lack of 
case law does not mean a higher standard 
of disclosure is not imposed on the doctor-
investigators. Clause 1.5 of the Code of 
Professional Conduct 1987 provides that:
In any research on human beings, 
each potential subject must be adequately 
informed of the aims, methods, anticipated 
benefits and potential hazards of the study 
and the discomfort it may entails. He or 
she should be informed that he or she is at 
liberty to abstain.
This special doctor-patient relationship 
is established between the ‘doctor’ and 
the patient based on the fact that most of 
the patients are originally a patient to the 
‘doctor’ before the latter involved in clinical 
trials. The existence of this relationship 
was the reason that strengthened patient-
subjects’ trust and confidence that ‘doctors’ 
will act in their interests and hence 
they accepted the doctors’ invitation to 
participate in the trial (Corfield et al., 2008; 
Pik Pin Goh, 2011). Hence, the existence 
of this relationship has indirectly hindered 
the patient to make a decision voluntarily. 
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A patient will mistakenly assume that he 
or she will be getting a treatment which 
the doctor trusts to be in the best interest 
by tolerant the doctors’ offer to join in 
the trial. Furthermore, when a person is 
suffering from a disease, he would then 
agree to do whatever he thinks can provide 
relief or cure. In other words, the illness 
borne by the patient makes him vulnerable 
- who would have to rely on the doctor - 
thus leaving him exposed of exploitation 
by the doctor.
Nevertheless, the authors are of the 
view that the attitude of the patient that sets 
high expectations on doctor-investigator 
has indirectly encouraged the latter not 
to disclose information by subscribing to 
the principle of therapeutic privilege. The 
special relationship that exists between 
‘doctor’ and patient has led the patient 
to believe and feel confident that the 
‘doctor’ will act in their best interest. 
This comforting trust has muffled the 
patient from asking the ‘doctor’ for further 
information.
 CONCLUSION
The existence of doctor-patient relationship 
is real and clinical trial is something that 
cannot be avoided. Most of the patient-
subjects are patients to the ‘doctor’ before 
the doctor ‘change cap’ and turn into 
a ‘doctor-investigator’ who immerses 
himself in clinical trials by recruiting them 
as patient-subjects. Nevertheless, they 
must always be vigilant and aware that 
they are no longer allowed to withhold 
information from the patients on the 
pretext of therapeutic privilege even 
though this practice seems to be normal in 
ordinary doctor-patient relationship. They 
are responsible to disclose full information 
pertaining to the trials and particularly 
the risks to patient-subjects. Furthermore, 
the objective of clinical trials is to benefit 
future patients and not the patient-subjects 
who are the “experimentation objects” for 
the advancement of the medical sciences. 
As such, we suggest that the Good 
Clinical Practice Training Curriculum1 
by the Ministry of Heath Malaysia is to be 
improvised by introducing a sub-topical 
subject additional to the same on the topic 
of doctor-patient relationship in clinical 
trials.
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